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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-v-
MARK VON STETTINA, Case No. 15919 
Defendant-Appellant. 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, MARK VON STETTINA, appeals from a 
conviction of Rape in the Third Judicial District Court, in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, MARK VON STETTINA, was charged with Rape, 
a Felony of the Second Degree, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-402 (1952 as amended) at jury trial before the Honorable 
Dean E. Conder. Appellant was convicted of the charge of Rape. 
Appellant was sentenced to the Utah State Prison for the indeter-
minate term of one to fifteen years for said conviction. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Appellant seeks a reversal of the conviction and judge-
ment rendered below and a remand of the case to the Third Judicial 
District Court for a new trial. 
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~TATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The State alleged that on July 3, 1979, Susie Stephenson, 
was raped by the defendant, Mark Von Stettina. At trial 21 year 
old Susie Stephenson testified that at around midnight on July 3, 
1979, she was at the Sun Tavern, a bar located in downtown Salt 
Lake City. She testified that she had arrived there about three 
hours earlier in the company of her sister and some friends and that 
she had been having a party and drinking with them and dancing with 
some of the people at the bar. She testified that she had been to 
that bar on many previous occasions. She testified that it was a 
gay bar and explained that she liked to dance and drink there. 
The prosecutrix met the appellant inside the Sun Tavern at approx-
imately 12:20 a.m. when he went to her table and introduced himself 
to her and asked her if she would like to dance. She agreed. He 
then asked her if she wanted to go outside and smoke some marijuana 
with him to which she also agreed. The two of them went outside the 
Sun Tavern and walked westward towards the Union Pacific Railroad 
Depot and a parking lot just to the south side of the entrance. 
Near that parking lot was a sloped grassy area out of the view of 
the street. They sat down together on the lawn. A pipe bowl was 
filled with marijuana. They smoked the marijuana together. The 
prosecutrix then testified that she wanted to go back and stood up 
to leave. The appellant took her arm and asked her to stay with him 
until he finished smoking the marijuana. She agreed and sat down 
beside him. He put his arm around her and kissed her. Prosecutrix 
-2-
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testified that she was frightened of him since she thought he was 
not gay but straight. She testified that he pushed her down on the 
ground on her back and began to take her pants off. She testified 
that she said no. She testified that he put his hand over her mouth 
and said "Do you want me to kill you?" She testified that he took 
a tampon out of her and had intercourse with her. Afterwards she 
sat with him and kissed him and walked back to the bar with him 
holding his hand and agreed to meet him later. Other witnesses for 
the State who had been at the bar and seen the prosecutrix at about 
closing time testified that she was crying. A police officer 
testified that she cried throughout the time that she was with her. 
Appellant was arrested in the area a short time later and made a 
complete statement to the police. Appellant testified at trial on 
his own behalf that he was at the Sun Tavern and made contact with 
Susie Stephenson at about midnight on July 3, 1979. He further 
testified that he asked her to dance and she agreed. He asked her 
then to go outside and smoke marijuana with him to which she also 
agreed. He described her as being friendly and nice and that they 
carried on a general conversation. He testified that they smoked 
marijuana together and that he began to kiss her and that he was 
feeling the effects of marijuana and she appeared to be feeling the 
effects of marijuana. He testified that he began kissing her and 
that he had one hand on her face as he was kissing her and he laid 
her down on her back. He testified that during that time she was 
saying "no don't" and that she was giggling at the same time. 
-3-
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They then had sex and.they then got up and sat there for a minute 
and kissed a few more times and started walking back across the 
stree.:t:::holding hands. Appellant stated that they continued talking an 
found out more about one another, Appellant asked her if she 
wanted to go with him to have a few more beers and a little more 
partying and she agreed. He told her that he needed to get a payroll 
check cashed at his place of employment which was Denny's and that 
he would be back shortly to pick her up. He testified that he went 
to a bar next door to the Sun and then on to Denny's. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 1 
THE EVIDENCE AS A MATTER OF LAW IS INSUFFICIENT 
TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION OF RAPE. 
The standard for review of the sufficiency of the evidence 
for a conviction is that "it must appear that upon so viewing 
the evidence, reasonable minds must necessarily entertain a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant cormnitted the crime". State 
v. Wilson, 565 P.2d 66 (1977). 
But when the sufficiency of the evidence is being re-
viewed in a sex-offense conviction, 
There must be considered the ease of assertion 
of the forcible accomplishment of the sexual 
act, with impossibility of defense excepty by 
direct denial, or of the proneness of the woman, 
when she finds the fact of her disgrace dis-
covered or likely of discovery to minimize 
her_ fault by asserting force or violence, which 
had led courts to hold to a very strict rule 
of proof in such cases. 
State v. Horne, 12 Utah 2d 162, 364 P.2d 109 
at 112 (1961). 
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The need for these added considerations in determining 
the sufficiency of the evidence in a sex-offense is that the un-
corroborated testimony of the prosecutrix will be enough to sus-
tain a conviction, State v. Hodges, 14 Utah 2d 197, 381 P.2d 81 
(1963). When the conviction is based upon the uncorroborated 
testimony of a single complaining witness the appellate Court 
must decide if the "evidence is so inherently improbable as to 
be unworthy of belief, that upon objective analysis, reasonable 
minds could not believe beyond a reasonable doubt, defendant 
was guilty of the offense charged". State v. Mills, 530 P.2d 
1272 (Utah, 1975). ~e also State v. Banks, 350 P.2d 416 (Utah 1960) 
The essential elements of the crime of rape are given 
in Utah Code Ann. §76-5-402 (1953 as amended). 
A male person commits rape when he has sexual 
intercourse with a female, not his wife, 
without her consent. Consent is defined 
by statute in Utah Code Annotated §76-5-406 
(1953 as amended). The subsections applicable 
in this case include: 
(1) When the actor compels the victim 
to submit or participate by force that 
overcomes such earnest resistance as 
might reasonably be expected under 
the circumstances; or , (2) The actor compels the victim to 
submit or participate by any threat 
that would prevent resistance by a 
person of ordinary resolution. 
Finally, the State has the burden of proving the lack of consent 
as an element of the crime. State v. Ward, 10 Utah 2d 34, 347 
P.2d 865 (1959). 
-5-
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POINT A 
THE PROSECUTRIX'S STORY IS INHERENTLY IMPROBABLE 
BECAUSE THERE IS NO EVIDENCE CORROBORATING HER 
CLAIM OF A LACK OF CONSENT, THE EVIDENCE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CONVICTION AS A 
MATTER OF LAW. 
In this case the appellant was convicted on the uncor-
roborated testimony of the prosecutrix. But the prosecutrix's 
testimony is so inherently improbable that it is unworthy of be-
lief. Thus, under State v. Mills, supra, this evidence is insuf-
ficient to support a conviction. 
The prosecutrix's testimony was replete with inconsisten-
cies and contradictions making her testimony improbable, and con-
sequently unworthy of belief. 
The major inconsistencies in the prosecutrix's testimony 
are when she described her own actions on the night of incident. 
She stated that she had had several drinks of alcoholic beverages 
throughout the evening. She stated that she had smoked a good 
deal of a pipe of marijuana shared with the appellant. She test-
ified that, however, none of these intoxicants had affected her 
mind. However, she was unclear on several of the sequences of 
events including her testimony at preliminary hearing that she 
stated that she had filled the pipe bowl with marijuana and at 
trial that he had filled the pipe bowl with marijuana. She by 
her own description, her actions were by far more consenting then 
not consenting. She agreed to go with the appellant to dance, she 
agreed to go with him to smoke marijuana, she agreed to allow him 
-6-
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to put his arm around her and kiss her. She agreed after sex to 
have him continue to kiss her, she agreed to walk with him hand in 
hand back to the Sun Tavern. She agreed to meet him later. She 
testified that she did not want him to think that she was afraid. 
She testified that she thought something would probably occur 
with him even though she still agreed to go with him to a secluded 
place. She testified that she fought him to the extent that she 
was able to get him off of her but that she did not run away nor 
did she at anytime scream or hit him. Because of these inconsist-
encies in certain aspects of her testimony concerning her ability 
to resist appellants advances and her efforts to indicate to him 
her consent the prosecutrix's story that the appellant forced her 
to engage in sex without her consent is inherently improbable. 
Thus, without further corroboration the prosecutrix's testimony 
of her failure to consent to the intercourse is insufficient as 
a matter of law to support a conviction. The prosecutrix's test-
imony that intercourse occurred without consent is uncorroborated 
and should be viewed carefully. The prosecutrix testified that 
at one point appellant's hand was over her mouth and nose and that 
she though that her nose had been broken. She admitted, however, 
thathernose did not bleed. No evidence was presented that she had 
severe injuries to her facial area. Witness who had seen the 
appellant at the bar that evening and police who interviewed the 
appellant at a later time did not present evidence that appellant 
was angry or violent. Consequently, reasonable minds would enter-
-7-
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tain a reasonable doubt that the appellant committed the crime. 
POINT B 
THE EVIDENCE WAS INSUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A CON-
VICTION AS A MATTER OF LAW BECAUSE LACK OF CON-
SENT WAS NOT PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT 
AND THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE OF REASONABLY EXPECTED 
RESISTANCE TO BE OVERCOME BY FORCE AND THERE WAS 
NO EVIDENCE OF IMMEDIATE THREATS WHICH WOULD 
PREVENT RESISTANCE BY A PERSON OF ORDINARY 
RESOLUTION. 
Under Utah Code Ann. §76-5-406 (1953 as amended) a lack 
of consent may be demonstrated by showing either force that over-
comes a reasonable resistance or threats that would prevent 
resistance by a person of ordinary resolution. 
In State v. Horne, supra, the resistance that the law 
requires a woman make is no "more than her age, strength, the 
surrounding facts, and allattending circumstances make it reason-
able for her to do in order to manifest her opposition". Id at 
p. 111, 112. In that case, the Utah Supreme Court found that facts 
insufficient as a matter of law to support a conviction. The factor: 
that the Court considered included: (1) during the period of time 
that the defendant was in her trailer the prosecutrix made no 
outcry; (2) the prosecutrix did not attempt to leave or seek help 
during the indicent; (3) there was no evidence of marks or bruises; 
(4) there was no evidence of threats made either upon the pros-
ecutrix or her children; and (5) the length of time the pros-
ecutrix waited before making a complaint. 
-8-
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During the time that the prosecutrix and appellant spent 
together, prosecutrix made no outcry. Although she testified 
people were in the area and it was a public place. Furthermore, 
even though the prosecutrix testified that she felt that she was 
going to have trouble she went with the appellant anyway and on 
the way there passed several individuals in the area. 
Secondly, the prosecutrix had ample opportunities to 
get away from the appellant but did not avail herself to such 
opportunities. 
Thirdly, there was little or no evidence of a struggle. 
The prosecutrix testified that she hurt her nose but there was 
no observable evidence of actual injury. She had no bruises, 
abraisions, lacerations around the face and throat nor any to any 
other area of her body. She had no marks on her mouth where 
she testified that appellant had grabbed her. Prosecutrix admits 
that she did not strike appellant, nor scratch him, nor try to 
hurt him even though she testified her hands were in no way bound. 
Prosecutrix testified that appellant said, "Do you want me to 
kill you?" She also testified that she did not respond since she 
did not want appellant to think that she was afraid. Prosecutrix 
claims that she was saying "No, no, no" to appellant. Appellant 
testified that while she said no that she was giggling and laughing 
and that she had allowed him to be kissing her just previously. 
Prosecutrix also stated that she had pleasant conversation with 
appellant before and after sex had occurred. That conversation 
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combined with the fact that there was no physical resistance does 
not provide sufficient evidence to establish that the prosecutrix 
resisted any force asserted by the appellant under the circum-
stances. 
Another factor in the Horne case was that there was no 
evidence that threats had been made. Here, the prosecutrix claims 
:i that~ the appellant asked if she wanted him to kill her. Prosecutrix 
testified that she had seen no evidence of a weapon and that she 
had been able to push him away on her own. This case is disting-
uishable from State v. Cederstrom, Utah Supreme Court No. 14777 
(December, 1977), in that the prosecutrix in Cederstrom claimed 
that the defendant also produced a knife, screw driver, or other 
object when making the threat that she would be hurt. Here no 
weapon was displayed. No weapon was ever found. In fact, the 
prosecutrix did not testify that the appellant had a weapon or 
threatened to use a weapon. Similarly, this case is distinguishable:: 
from State v. Studham,572 P.2d 700 (1977). In the Studham case, 
this Court found several facts which in totality added to the 
circumstances, the prosecutrix had resisted force sufficient to meet~ 
the standards in the Horne case. In that case, the evidence showed 
that the prosecutrix had a young son in the apartment and that she 
had a bruise or cut on her lip. The prosecutrix had testified that 
defendant had told her that she would not live to be past the age 
of twenty-one. The threats, combined with the concern of the 
safety of the young child and the bruises or cut on her lip, were 
-10-
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sufficient to show that the prosecutrix had acted reasonably under 
the circumstances. This case is distinguishable, however, on 
several grounds. First of all, the prosecutrix had no young son 
or other person to protect besides herself. Secondly, this act 
occurred in a public place not too far from a well traveled area 
in which the prosecutrix knew that there was other people. Thirdly, 
prosecutrix displayed no signs of physical injury or trauma such 
that might be expected if one had resisted force. It must be 
remembered that in this case, the prosecutrix is 21 years old and 
in good health. She had not been forced to go any place that she 
did not want to go. In fact, she had agreed to go with appellant. 
She had agreed to smoke marijuana with appellant. She had agreed 
to allow him to kiss her and put his arm around her. She agreed 
to meet him later. She was aware at the Sun Tavern that people 
do go with one another to have sex. She testified that she suspected 
that something was going to happen. Yet in this case the prosecutrix 
put up no recognizable physical resistance other than the words 
no, no, no, gave very little indication of lack of consent. 
Combined with the fact that she had agreed to several other acts, 
and that she had partaken of intoxicants which may have caused her 
to giggle and laugh is apparent that no lack of consent was dis-
played by the prosecutrix. 
On the basis of these facts, a reasonable mind would 
entertain a reasonable doubt that there was a lack of consent on 
-11-
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the part of the prosecutrix, and judgment must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
The evidence in this case is insufficient for the 
appellant to be convicted of rape. The prosecutrix testified 
that there was a threat made to her. However, this is in direct 
conflict with the appellant's testimony concerning the events. 
Furthermore, the prosecutrix testified that at one point she was 
able to get the appellant away from her but made no move to run 
away from him. The prosecutrix's lack of consent was not evi-
denced by resistance reasonable for her age, strength, the 
surrounding facts and attending circumstances. The prosecutrix 
testified she did not see any weapon nor was there any threat 
made with regard to a weapon and that combined with the fact that 
she knew that she was able to get away from appellant by her own 
testimony shows that the prosecutrix did not resist in a way 
reasonably expected under the circumstances. Her only indication 
to appellant that she did not consent was when she said no, no. 
This, however, could be misinterpretted as no resistance if combined 
with giggling. At no time did the prosecutrix make an attempt to 
leave the area after she had agreed to kiss the appellant and 
allow him to have his arm around her. She did not make any attempt 
to attract the attention of others even though she knew that there 
were other people in the area. Prosecutrix suffered no physical 
injury, there was no physical damage to any of her clothing as 
a result of this incident. Furthermore, as she was returning to 
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the tavern the prosecutrix agreed to meet the appellant at a 
later time and continued to converse with him and continued to 
walk hand in hand with him. The total circumstances surrounding 
this incident give rise to a reasonable doubt. The evidence was 
insufficient to sustain a conviction for the crime of rape. 
Respectfully submitted, 
G. L. FLETCHER 
Attorney for Appellant 
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